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Abstract (max 300 words) 
Tracking and explaining patterns and trajectories of social and economic change in the global South 
is a key challenge for geographers. Panel studies, though rare, offer a particularly rich alternative 
insight to more usual cross-sectional studies. Drawing on a 25-year longitudinal panel study of two 
villages in rural Thailand, this paper reveals the complexities of the processes underway, the shifting 
terrains of explanation, and the surprises that are easily overlooked in cross-sectional studies, 
particularly when it comes to household life chances and courses. The paper makes a case for the 
value of such approaches and the insights they can provide. 
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Introduction: tracking and explaining change in the global South 
Tracking and explaining patterns and trajectories of social and economic change in the global South 
is a key challenge for geographers: what is changing, how fast, in what direction, for whom, and 
why? Most geographical studies, often for practical reasons, involve single visits, from which change 
is projected backwards and, often, also extrapolated into the future. Identifying change on the basis 
of such studies is problematic on a number of counts, not least their reliance on respondents’ 
memories, patchy secondary data, and researchers’ impressions. Longitudinal studies where the 
research site is re-visited and re-surveyed are comparatively rare.1 Moreover, the large proportion 
are cross-sectional re-studies involving sampling across a population, from which change is tracked 
and mapped. Even fewer studies are panel re-studies where the unit of analysis – here, individual 
households – is followed over time. 
 
Panel studies provide an alternative insight into processes of social and economic transformation. In 
particular, they permit us to track personal life histories; enable the linking of micro and macro 
processes of change; facilitate the teasing out of change between different social groups; and can 
help to explain why a rising tide does not lift all boats. There are evident practical and 
methodological problems with panel studies, especially in poorer countries, which go some way to 
explaining their general (relative) paucity. These include the problem of attrition; the absence of 
accurate household rosters making sampling and follow-up particularly challenging; and the 
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difficulty of dealing with household ‘splitting’. In addition, most panel studies in the global South 
have been conducted over relative short return intervals and most are quantitative rather than 
qualitative (Krishna 2010: 28-32).  
 
This paper focuses on two aspects of panel studies, drawing on long-term work in the Northeast of 
Thailand. First, the paper seeks to highlight the ‘value-added’ of panel studies – what they offer that 
cross-sectional studies do not; and, second, it reflects on the difficulty of explaining the changes that 
such data sets reveal. 
 
The study 
The case discussed here is based on a longitudinal study of two villages in the province of 
Mahasarakham in Northeast Thailand.2 The first survey of 81 households was undertaken in 1982-
1983; a second survey in 1994 covered 77 of the original 81 households; and a third re-study in 
2008-2009 surveyed the same 77 households as the 1994 study. In the quarter of a century between 
the first and most recent surveys, a significant proportion of the original interviewees (usually the 
household head) had died; in addition, new splinter households had often formed as sons and 
daughters married and established their own households, sometimes in the same village. The 
households interviewed in the second and third rounds of the survey were the households or 
descendant households living in the study villages, on the same house compound. 
 
A detailed household roster was completed for the 2008 restudy and we were able to trace 489 or 
96 per cent of the 509 household members recorded in 1982–1983. Of these 509, 304 or 62 per cent 
had ‘left’ their original household either due to death, migration or because they had set up their 
own household in the survey villages. Some 180 of the 509 (37 per cent) were still living and resident 
in their villages (Table 1). 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Tracking poverty and prosperity 
One of the aims of the study was to track household poverty and prosperity over time in the context 
of Thailand’s rapid economic transformation. We knew that these villagers, like most of the 
population of Thailand, were measurably better off in material terms – the country is, after all, an 
Asian ‘miracle’ economy. But we wondered how this national, aggregate picture had become 
grounded over time for individual households in the poorest region of the country. 
 
For both surveys, we collected income data covering farm and non-farm activities as well as 
information on remittances from absent migrant household members. The 2008 survey tried to 
replicate as closely as possible the 1982/83 survey, while also including some additional measures of 
wealth that were not collected during the original fieldwork. In addition, a number of wealth ranking 
exercises were carried out to cross-check the findings of the survey. Based on these data, we 
produced a figure plotting the relative income rank of each household within the cohort at each 
survey period (Figure 1). The highest ranked household, the richest in income terms, is at the top of 
the listing in each of the two survey periods, progressing down to the poorest at the foot. The lines 
between the two survey periods connect the same households. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The first thing to note about Figure 1 is the remarkable level of turbulence in relative household 
status between the two time periods. We had expected that the relative poverty and prosperity of 
the first generation would, broadly speaking, be reproduced in the next and that major movements 
up and down the rankings would be the exception rather than the rule. But of the 13 households 
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that belonged to the poorest quintile in 1982/83 only three were in the same quintile in 2008. For 
the richest quintile in 1982/83, five households retained this position in the 2008 survey. The 
remainder had slipped down in the rankings with two of the ‘original rich’, becoming members of 
the ‘new poor’. 
 
Explaining turbulence 
What explains the level of turbulence in our income data? Four, not mutually exclusive, explanations 
offer themselves: 
 
1. The role of life course dynamics; 
2. structural changes in the production of poverty and prosperity in the study sites; 
3. the shape of upward and downward livelihood movements;  
4. and a ‘series of unfortunate events’. 
 
The role of life course dynamics 
We first thought that the movements up and down the relative wealth rankings might reflect 
household life course dynamics in which higher incomes are generated by ‘mature’ households 
where parents and children are of working age. Young or ‘pre-prosperous’ and old or ‘post-
prosperous’ households would have reduced income earning opportunities because of their 
respectively young and old age dependency. Table 2 provides a summary of household size and 
dependency ratios for the richest and poorest quintiles at the two survey periods. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In 1982/83, the household membership of the poorest and richest quintiles was similar: 6.31 versus 
7.00 persons per household. Indeed, there is no significant correlation between total household 
membership and quintile wealth distribution across the whole sample. Furthermore, the total 
dependency ratio of the poorest quintile was slightly less than that of the richest (55 per cent versus 
60 per cent). It was not a case of the richer households simply having more adult, economically 
active household members to deploy. That said, the use of dependency ratios for 1982/83 is 
problematic: age is not a good indicator of economic activity in 1982/83. School age children filled 
an economic role (looking after buffalo, collecting wild foods and so forth), while villagers over 65 
years old were also characteristically economically active even if they had passed on the physically 
more demanding farming tasks like ploughing to their younger kin.  
 
In 2008, the total household membership of the poorest and richest quintiles had widened to four 
versus almost six (Table 2). In terms of the total dependency ratio, the poorest quintile had a 65 per 
cent dependency ratio while for the richest quintile it was 45 per cent. For the whole sample, there 
is a moderate, positive and significant correlation between total household membership and quintile 
income distribution (r = .40, n = 76, p <.0005). It seems that while in 1982/83 household size was not 
a factor determining wealth status, by 2008 it had become so. Interviews helped to illuminate the 
possible reasons. 
 
In 2008 household labour availability was a major difficulty facing farmers. Labour was expensive 
and reciprocal labour exchange, which in the past was a key source of seasonal labour, had virtually 
disappeared. At the same time, the extension of childhood with the period of compulsory education 
increasing from six to nine years in 1997, and from nine to 12 years in 1999, was making it 
increasingly difficult for parents to ‘deploy’ their children as an economic resource. What we see 
here, then, is dependency – and especially child dependency – become an increasing issue in shaping 
the labour resources available to households, and therefore their income earning capacity. This also 
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hints at the way in which wider, structural changes in the Thai economy were rippling back to be 
seen reflected in village wealth profiles. 
 
Structural change in the production of poverty and prosperity 
In 1982, the two study villages were semi-subsistence agrarian communities. To be sure, the 
pressure for cash was growing but, even so, most villagers kept their eyes firmly on the prize of 
meeting their existential subsistence needs. This is the most environmentally marginal region of 
Thailand and people were juggling risk and reward in a carefully choreographed strategy wherein 
rain-fed rice cultivation was distributed across different agro-ecological niches. Cash crops were 
grown on upland not suited to wet rice, but it was wet rice cultivation which occupied people’s time 
and minds.  
 
In the 1980s in rural settlements such as these, studies often used landholdings as a proxy for 
wealth. This made sense in a context where farming dominated livelihoods. As Table 3 shows, the 
richest quintile did own significantly more land than the poorest in 1982/83. By 2008, however, this 
relationship has been turned on its head and land ownership had become a marker of (relative) 
poverty, rather than (relative) wealth. We can explain this in terms of the sources of income/wealth 
in a context where livelihoods are becoming mixed (less farm-based) and the returns to different 
factors of production (land, labour, capital) are in flux. This indicates an important change in the 
production of wealth/poverty; wealth is now no longer tied to land but is linked to access to non-
farm work and the ability to move (migrate) and this, in turn, to education, infrastructure and the 
life course. Regarding the latter, migration tends to occurs at particular stages in the life course and 
households with caring responsibilities generally find it more difficult to engage in work away from 
home. We also see in Table 3 how the explanatory power of other farm-based assets has also 
declined: the buffalo is virtually extinct in the villages (land is prepared mechanically) and head of 
cattle is also no longer a meaningful marker of wealth. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It is important to note that land only has the potential to be productive; we cannot read-off from 
ownership a certain level of production. Certainly, in the 1980s all available land was used, unless 
environmental conditions prevented this.3 By the 2000s, however, land might stand idle because of 
lack of labour (due to migration); it might be retained for speculative or emotional reasons, rather 
than for production; and, most common, it was farmed less intensively (again for reasons of labour 
availability) resulting in reduced production. 
 
It might be expected that the formerly rich in agrarian terms would have been able in the 
intervening years to invest in the education of their children and therefore reproduce their previous 
wealth in the context of Thailand’s fast evolving economy, productively deploying their assets and 
social capital. What, however, this shift has done is to fray the previous link between the ownership 
of farm assets, mainly land, and wealth and therefore offered scope for the relative poor to benefit 
from Thailand’s industrialisation, potentially unsettling the social order of things in the villages. 
 
The shape of upward and downward livelihood movements 
Figure 1 reflects the sum total of livelihood movements (gauged in income terms) between 1982/83 
and 2008. Between the two survey periods is a long stretch of time during which households may 
have moved up and down the relative wealth league table. This is hidden from us. However it does 
seem, and this is reflected in other studies, that upwards and downward livelihood movements take 
different ‘shapes’ (Rigg et al. 2014).4 Upward movements are gradual and incremental; downward 
shifts are sudden and ‘lumpy’. Assets and wealth are built up over time through hard work and 
careful living. Rarely do people ‘strike rich’, although inheritance may lift a household into prosperity 
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quite suddenly. But while wealth is rarely accumulated overnight, it can be lost in a moment (see 
below and Hulme and Shepherd 2003: 409). So behind Figure 1 are not just over 25 years of personal 
life histories and all these entail and embody, but also importantly different livelihood movements. 
The downward movements not infrequently reflect untoward events: stuff happens. 
 
A series of unfortunate events 
Our interviews with households in 2008 and 2009 revealed the degree to which downward 
movements were explained by simple ‘bad luck’, reversals of fortune that could not be foreseen – a 
roll of the dice, as it were. In particular, road accidents and serious illness were frequent and could 
propel a household doing quite well into relative village poverty. As Krishna (2010, and see Krishna 
2013) says, many people in the global South are ‘one illness away’ from poverty. 
 
It was only in 2002 that the Thai government introduced the 30-baht universal health care system. 
Until that time – in other words for the large part of the period covered by this longitudinal study – 
there was no safety net for those facing large health care costs. Given that for the poor their main 
asset is their labour, illness can be devastating for livelihoods (see Smith 2002, Hulme 2003, Hulme 
and Moore 2010). Assets are disposed of to meet medical expenses and a household’s prospects 
may be irreparably compromised. This, it is important to note, can afflict the far-from-poor as well as 
the near-poor (Krishna and Shariff 2011: 542–3). 
 
Mrs Achara was a case in point. When she was first interviewed in 1983 Achara and her husband were 
relatively prosperous in village terms, owning a good-sized plot of rice land and running a profitable 
livestock trading business. When she was re-interviewed in May 2008 and for a third time in 2009, she 
could be counted as one of the village ‘poor’.  
 
Achara’s husband was struck by lightning and killed in 1983. With three young children and an 
adoptive son to support, her husband’s livestock business collapsed. In 1986, Achara was 
hospitalised with a liver complaint and was forced to sell a large part of her land to pay the medical 
bills. Two decades later, one of her sons was killed in a road accident in the Eastern seaboard resort 
of Pattaya.  
 
On the face of it this ‘bad luck’ may seem exceptional. We were surprised, however, how often 
downward livelihood movements were explained by such unfortunate events. Their significance is 
related to a number of intersecting factors: the absence, until recently, of universal health care in 
Thailand; an eroded ‘moral’ economy that might have provided a community safety net; the fact 
that those in non-farm work were often on casual contracts or worked in the informal sector; and 
the reality, even given some mechanisation, that farming relies above all else on human labour. Such 
downward movements also often exhibited hysteresis – in other words, their effects resonated 
through time, and sometimes across generations, even when the event itself was long in the past 
(Horrell et al. 2001). Our households were certainly much richer but they were also, in some 
respects, also more vulnerable. 
 
Relatively poorer, absolutely richer – but still not that far from absolute poverty 
What can be easily lost in the discussion above is that all the households in 2008 were measurably 
better off in material terms than they were in 1982/83. Table 4 shows that the poorest household in 
2008 was earning six times more in (2008) baht terms than the poorest household in 1982. Mean 
real incomes had trebled.  
 




This is not to say, however, that no one felt poor in the villages. The pressure of needs in Thailand to 
pay electricity bills, university tuition, petrol, treats for the children, nights out… these have become 
essential to decent living. It is hard to survive – if we see survival not in existential but in social terms 
– on 50,000 baht a year (less than GBP 1,000 at 2008 exchange rates). The second point is that many 
households, even if they are non-poor in absolute terms, are often not far away from the poverty 
line. Figure 2 shows the proportion of the Thai population living below the $1.25 and $2-a-day 
absolute poverty lines. While the $1.25 poor comprise under 0.5 per cent of the Thai population (on 
the basis of which we might be able to say that absolute poverty has been ‘eradicted’), ten times 
more live on less than $2-a-day. It does not take much of a downturn in personal fortunes to force 
these households below the lower of the two absolute poverty lines. 
 
Methodological reflections 
Table 3 shows ownership of a range of assets by the richest and poorest quintiles of the sample 
households. In 1982/83, there was a noticeable differentiation between the richest and poorest 
quintiles on the basis of most of these measures. The 2008 survey, however, shows that much of this 
differentiation had disappeared. In other words, the key markers of wealth and poverty as they were 
identified in the first survey had become ‘normal’ by the second survey. Only the pattern of 
ownership of vehicles (which no one owned in 1982/83) acts as a proxy for wealth in 2008. 
Methodologically, this means that the validity of certain indicators in capturing wealth 
differentiation has been diluted over the years, due to changing socio-economic conditions in the 
villages and in Thailand more generally. Not only do the roots of poverty and prosperity change with 
development (as noted above), so do the markers of poverty and prosperity. 
 
There is a second issue which the data collected did not discriminate but which interviews indicated 
was important in distinguishing the poor and the non-poor. It was suggested to us that 
prosperity/poverty in village terms could not be accurately gauged in terms of what households 
owned; rather it was how they came to own these items which was important. Easy credit and loans 
had meant that the purchase of quite big ticket items such a motorbikes was within the reach of 
almost everyone. Richer households tended to use their savings to acquire motorbikes; poorer 
households accessed credit, commonly through hire-purchase agreements.  
 
Conclusion: the value of tracking households and people’s lives  
This panel study reveals an alternative, complementary insight into income/wealth dynamics in two 
villages in Northeast Thailand from that offered by more usual cross-sectional studies. The 
dynamism that we identified mirrors the findings of Edmundson (1994: 140) where he noted in the 
case of Java, Indonesia that “the rich and the poor may be ‘with us always’ but the individuals who 
comprise these groups appear to be always changing”. This emphasises the turbulence that has 
accompanied livelihood change among the surveyed households and the apparent tenuousness of 
one household’s wealth rank relative to others. While structural interpretations may stress the 
degree to which households and individuals are ‘trapped’ in poverty (and, by implication, others are 
‘embedded’ in a condition of wealth), these data reveal something far more fluid. We may be able to 
identify ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ categories but the households who populate these categories are far from 
fixed. The reasons for this, however, are complex and reflect the interplay of era defining change, 
life course processes and stochastic shocks. 
 
Structural or era-defining changes in Thailand’s economy mean that the key shaping factors that 
defined and delimited livelihoods in the 1980s did not have the same purchase in 2008. Land and 
farm-based occupations, for example, have been eclipsed by non-farm based occupations. Access to 
these new occupations is afforded not by inherited land but by acquired education. The former may 
assist in acquiring the latter, but the link is not fixed. In addition to education, age (generation), and 
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gender are also important filters when it comes to understanding access to non-farm work in the 
new Thai economy. The balance and role played by the different factors of production has changed. 
 
Building on the last point and second, we can understand the revealed wealth turbulence in terms of 
household-level social and life course processes and, in particular, the way in which age/gender 
shape access. Households with high levels of child/youth or elderly dependency found that the 
nature of work in the modern economy is more restrictive and restricted. Unlike farming in the 
1980s which provided niches for work for both and genders and almost all age groups, non-farm 
work – also bearing in mind that much is ex situ – has more restrictive and limiting rules of access. In 
addition the study shows how the terrain of explanation has shifted over time; what seemed like 
entirely reasonable indicators of wealth in the early 1980s, for example, had little explanatory 
purchase by 2008.  
 
Finally, our data indicate that there is a strong case not to discount stochastic or idiosyncratic 
events. Not only are such events far from exceptional, but with so many households carrying high 
debts, having little in the way of savings and earning limited incomes, with a restricted state-woven 
social security net, and with an eroded moral economy of mutual assistance, it is easy for 
households to find themselves tumbling down the livelihood ladder. Climbing back up is far more 
difficult. 
 
In this paper we are, in effect, making a case for the value of panel studies in building an 
understanding of social and economic transformation in the global South. Such studies are rare in 
general, and particularly rare in Geography. We argue that such an approach provides an alternative 
window that can identify important trends and explanatory possibilities that are often not evident in 
cross-sectional studies, let alone single visit studies. There are, to be sure, challenges with such 
approaches, and these tend to be magnified in the poorest countries. Nonetheless panel studies 
provide a powerful methodological tool to track, identify and interpret change. 
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Table 1: Household attrition over 25 years 























304 no longer members of original 
household (62% of those traced) 
149 moved to 
places outside the 
village (49%) 
64 set up own 
household in the 
original village 
(21%) 
88 died (29%) 
3 untraceable 
(1%) 
180 household members resident in 
original household (37%) 
 
5 members untraceable (1%)  
 





Table 2: Household membership, dependency rates and wealth, 1982/83 and 2008 









Richest quintile 7.00 60 5.93 45 
Poorest quintile 6.31 55 4.00 65 
 
Notes: Total dependency ratio is equal to the number of people aged 0 to 14 added to the number of 
people aged 65 and over, divided by the number of people aged 15 to 64. The result is then 
multiplied by 100.  
 





Table 3: Asset ownership, 1982/83 and 2008 
 1982/83 2008 
 Poorest quintile Richest quintile Poorest quintile Richest quintile 
Number of 
households 
13 15 15 15 
Landholdings (rai) 13.0 21.8 20.8 14.8 
Vehicles 0 0 1 8 
Motorcycle 2 7 12 15 
TV 2 7 14 15 
Buffalo 1.9 3.2 0.3 0.0 
Cattle 4.3 25.5 7.8 11.9 
 
Note: 1 rai = 0.16 ha 
 





Table 4: Average annual income, 1982/83 and 2008 (baht) 
 Minimum income Maximum income Mean 
1982/83 1,180 286,740 50,473 
2008 7,380 874,056 160,111 
 
Note: all income in Thai baht, adjusted to 2008 prices; n = 76 
 






Figure 1: Income ranking, 1982/83 and 2008 
 
 
Note: baht in constant 2008 prices 




Figure 2: Proportion of the Thai population living on less than $1.25 and $2-a-day, 1981-2010 
 
 
 1981 1990 1996 2000 2006 2010 
Poverty at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population) 21.9 11.6 2.48 3.04 1.01 0.38 
Poverty at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population) 44.1 37.1 14.6 18.1 7.63 4.05 
% living under $2 a day as a multiple of those 
living under $1.25 a day 2.01 3.21 5.87 5.94 7.55 10.7 
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Poverty at $1.25-a-day (PPP) (%
of population)
Poverty at $2-a-day (PPP) (% of
population)
% living under $2-a-day as a





1 For a recent collection of re-studies from Asia, see Rigg and Vandergeest 2012. 
2 [DELETED] 
3 The region is environmentally marginal and during times of flooding and drought some 
land is cannot be cultivated. 
4 See the work of Baulch and Davis in Bangladesh (Baulch and Davis, 2008; Davis, 2006, 
2007; Davis and Baulch, 2011). 
                                                          
